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Abstract
Background: Theories of categorization make different predictions about the underlying processes used to represent
categories. Episodic theories suggest that categories are represented in memory by storing previously encountered
exemplars in memory. Prototype theories suggest that categories are represented in the form of a prototype independently
of memory. A number of studies that show dissociations between categorization and recognition are often cited as
evidence for the prototype account. These dissociations have compared recognition judgements made to one set of items
to categorization judgements to a different set of items making a clear interpretation difficult. Instead of using different
stimuli for different tests this experiment compares the processes by which participants make decisions about category
membership in a prototype-distortion task and with recognition decisions about the same set of stimuli by examining the
Event Related Potentials (ERPs) associated with them.
Method: Sixty-three participants were asked to make categorization or recognition decisions about stimuli that either
formed an artificial category or that were category non-members. We examined the ERP components associated with both
kinds of decision for pre-exposed and control participants.
Conclusion: In contrast to studies using different items we observed no behavioural differences between the two kinds of
decision; participants were equally able to distinguish category members from non-members, regardless of whether they
were performing a recognition or categorisation judgement. Interestingly, this did not interact with prior-exposure.
However, the ERP data demonstrated that the early visual evoked response that discriminated category members from non-
members was modulated by which judgement participants performed and whether they had been pre-exposed to category
members. We conclude from this that any differences between categorization and recognition reflect differences in the
information that participants focus on in the stimuli to make the judgements at test, rather than any differences in encoding
or process.
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Introduction
A fundamental aspect of human cognition is the ability to
acquire knowledge of categories. This enables us to assign
properties to an object that we have learned are common to
other members of that category. This has clear survival value, for
instance we may be reluctant to eat a plant with milky sap that we
have not encountered before if we have learned that other plants
with milky sap are poisonous. We should infer that the new plant is
also likely to fall into the category of poisonous plants.
Precisely how the mind represents categories has received a
substantial amount of attention and recently theories of categorization
have been informed by studies involving amnesic patients and
functional imaging. The present research is concerned with two
classes of theory of categorization in particular: episodic models and
prototype models. Both prototype and episodic models assume that
categorization decisions are based on similarity. According to episodic
models we memorize each instance of a category [1]. When asked to
decide whether novel items are category members or not, the decision
is based on a comparison of the item with each stored exemplar. In
effect categorization is little more than a form of episodic memory. By
contrast, prototype models assume that the categorization decision is
based on the similarity of the item to a prototype, rather than to
stored exemplars [2]. A prototype is usually defined as an abstraction
of the central tendency or an average of previously encountered
exemplars. The exemplars themselves need not be stored in memory
giving prototype theory an economical advantage. Exemplar theory
has the advantage of computational simplicity. There are a number of
different candidate models within each class. We refer to episodic
models as any model that describes categorization as essentially a
memory based process as distinct from models that assume some form
of abstraction occurs during learning as is described by prototype
models. We discuss in more detail one episodic model that is based on
exemplar similarity [3], although it is our intention to compare
episodic models generally with prototype models rather than any one
specific episodic model.
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A method that is frequently used to decide between these two
classes of model is to identify dissociations between categorization
and recognition. That is, if different patterns of data are observed
when experimental participants are asked to make recognition
decisions for category members that they have previously
encountered compared to when they are asked to make decisions
about the category membership of novel items, the conclusion that
is often made is that these two decisions recruit different processes
[4,5,6]. The same logic is often used in studies that attempt to
understand many cognitive processes that appear to involve
separate processes, such as between implicit and explicit learning,
re, priming and recognition, and recollection and familiarity based
memory. Typically however, studies of this kind compare
responses to different stimuli. In many respects it seems sensible
to use stimuli in a recognition test that have previously been
memorized and to compare this to a categorization test using
novel stimuli. However, it is inevitably unclear whether any
observed differences in behaviour are due to the differences in the
stimuli (old items are by definition more familiar than novel items),
rather than differences in the processes used to make the decisions.
That is, when dissociations between categorization and recogni-
tion are based on different stimuli it is difficult to determine if the
reported differences are due to the underlying processes, rather
than some difference in the stimuli. A convincing dissociation
would be apparent when it is observed in different decisions about
the same stimuli. The principle aim of this paper is to compare
recognition and categorization using the same set of stimuli. If
differences in behaviour are observed in this case then we can
conclude that these two kinds of decision do indeed recruit
different processes. Because many previous studies have used
neuropsychological methods to dissociate processes, and because
similar behaviour can arise from different underlying processes, we
examined both ERP activity and behavioural responses for
recognition and categorization.
Prototype-distortion tasks have been influential in developing
our understanding of how knowledge of categories is acquired [7].
This particular paradigm is useful, because it permits the study of
how participants learn information, whether by memory or
abstraction, that is unlikely to be influenced by prior knowledge.
In this paradigm a prototype stimulus is formed by generating a
random pattern of nine dots, and additional category members are
created by distorting the coordinates of each dot of the prototype
(see Figure 1). In the standard preparation participants are first
shown a set of category members but not the prototype stimulus
Figure 1. Example Stimuli.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010116.g001
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itself. In a subsequent test participants are shown a set of
previously unseen patterns that consists of category members that
vary in their similarity to the prototype, along with the prototype
item itself, and category non-members. Numerous studies report
that participants are more likely to endorse items that are similar
to the prototype, including the prototype, as category members
than dissimilar items [8]. This pattern of results is often interpreted
as evidence that participants abstract a representation of the
category that closely matches the prototype even though this is not
present in the study period. This contrasts with an alternative
model that assumes categories are represented by storing
previously encountered instances in episodic memory [9].
Evidence from studies of amnesic patients and brain imaging
support the prototype abstraction model of categorization by
showing dissociations between categorization and recognition of
study items. These suggest that categorization is predicated on a
set of neural processes different from memory of the study items.
[4,5,10]. The rationale for this is that if the prototype is abstracted
during the study episode then episodic memory would not be
required to store the study exemplars. It follows that knowledge of
the category could be acquired by patients with organic amnesia.
Indeed, at least three studies have found similar patterns of
categorization in amnesic patients and healthy controls [4,5,10].
However, the amnesic patients performed at chance in a
subsequent recognition test of the study exemplars. By contrast
the control participants performed much better in the recognition
test. The conclusion from prototype-distortion studies in amnesic
patients is that category knowledge can be acquired in the absence
of memory for study exemplars.
Data from a number of fMRI studies also lend support to this
model. These tend to be concerned with activity that occurs when
participants are asked to make decisions at test, rather than activity
that might result from prototype abstraction during the study
episode. The first study of this kind reported decreased activity in
regions of the posterior occipital cortex for category members
relative to category non-members [11]. One possibility is that
category members are processed more fluently than non-members.
An increase in activity was observed in frontal cortical areas that
may be related to conscious deliberation of whether an item is a
category member or not [11]. A related study [12] replicated the
finding that the posterior occipital cortex shows a decrease in
activation for category members relative to category non-
members. Moreover, a separate recognition task revealed
increased activation in the frontal and temporal lobes and,
importantly, that the posterior occipital cortex showed increased
activation. This finding appears to show a dissociation in the kind
of activation resulting from categorization and recognition
decisions. A possible interpretation may be that categorization
relies on processes akin to perceptual priming and perhaps
familiarity based memory [11]. However, the activation of
different neural regions may also be influenced by how the
participants are instructed to learn the category. For example,
different patterns of activity have been observed when participants
categorize test items following either incidental or intentional
learning instructions during the study episode [6]: intentional
learning results in activation of the hippocampus; by contrast
incidental learning results in deactivation of the posterior occipital
cortex. Other studies indicate that explicit memory might be
involved in the early stages of learning as shown by hippocampal
activation, but this declines as knowledge of the category is
acquired [13,14].
Despite the evidence in favour of prototype abstraction an
alternative episodic model proposes that categorization is based
merely on exemplar similarity. According to this model [9,15]
participants make categorization judgements on the basis of the
similarity of the test items to an episodic representation of the
study items. Dissociations between categorization and recognition
arise from a more liberal criterion for accepting test items as
category members than for accepting test items as previously
encountered. This model has had some success in accounting for
behavioural data in healthy participants. How then can this model
account for the preserved capacity to form categories in amnesic
patients? The model does this by assuming that episodic memory
is impaired but not entirely eliminated by organic amnesia [16]. In
this way a liberal response criterion results in preserved
categorization. It is not clear however, how this model can
account for the data obtained from fMRI studies, which show
qualitatively different patterns of activity for recognition and
categorization, unless these effects result from the use of different
stimuli in the categorization and recognition tests.
Event Related Potentials (ERP) can also provide potentially
useful information about the neural correlates of category learning
[17], but this technique has not previously been used in this
specific paradigm. This method has the advantage over fMRI in
that categorization and recognition can be disambiguated by
differences in both timing and region. One previous experiment
that used different materials (blobs rather than patterns of dots)
found different ERPs for categorization and recognition [17].
Early visual potentials (N1, 156–200 msecs) were associated with
category membership. The amplitude was significantly more
negative for category members than for non-members. These data
are consistent with fMRI studies that implicate the posterior
occipital cortex in categorization [11], and support the view that
this region (and categorization) is predicated on largely visual
processes [18]. Middle latency components (FN400, 300–
500 msecs) were associated with both category membership and
with recognition. This component is interesting because it is
thought to underlie familiarity based processing in dual-process
theories of recognition memory [19,20]. Later potentials in
parietal regions (400-msecs) were associated with recognition only.
This component is related to explicit recognition (i.e. recollection)
of information from previous study episodes [20], and is thought to
result from deeper hippocampal and medial temporal lobe activity
because it is absent in patients with lesions of the hippocampus
[21]. Because the timings of these effects are so brief differences
between categorization and recognition are not likely to be
detected using fMRI. If there are differences in the processes
recruited by categorization and recognition we believe that they
are most likely to be found using ERPs.
In the experiment that follows we compare the ERPs of
categorization and recognition in the prototype-distortion task.
The experiment is necessary because all of the previous
neuropsychological investigations of this task have been conducted
using fMRI, amnesic patients, or both. Moreover, given that
prototype abstraction is typically related to early visual processing,
ERPs, with their high-temporal resolution, ought to provide the
ideal technique to study these processes [18]. The previously
mentioned examination of ERPs in categorization was conducted
using a different kind of stimuli [17] and it is necessary to
determine if the same processes and neural mechanisms are
involved in this task. The experiment is also important because it
introduces a methodological advance over the previous ones. All of
the studies mentioned previously have compared recognition and
categorization tasks using different items, because the categoriza-
tion tasks require previously unstudied category members and
recognition tasks require that at least half of the test items have
been studied before. Because these previous studies have used
different items in their categorization and recognition tests it is
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conceivable that the reported dissociations have occurred because
of differences in the stimuli rather than purely differences in the
processes underlying the decisions. In the experiment that follows
two groups of participants made either recognition or categoriza-
tion decisions about the same set of test items. Crucially, for the
recognition group the category members used in the test were also
used during the study period as category exemplars. The
categorization group differs in that a different set of category
exemplars was used for the study items. In this way we can ensure
that any differences between categorization and recognition are
due to the underlying cognitive process and not to perceptual
differences between the items used in the two tests. This control of
stimulus equivalence is also crucial for the ERP comparison.
There were also two control groups who made either recognition
or categorization decisions about the same sets of items but who
saw no exemplars in the study period. Two previous comparisons
of categorization and recognition in prototype-distortion tasks
found that in terms of behavioural accuracy recognition was
superior to categorization [10,22]. These studies did use different
items for each test, but if as the authors claim there is a process
difference between the two kinds of decision we should obtain
similar results even when, as in the experiment that follows, the
stimuli are identical. On the other hand, if the two decisions
involve the same underlying process, and if the previous results are
due to differences in the items, then there should be no difference
in the accuracy of recognition and categorization behaviour.
Predications about the precise ERP components that we might
observe are necessarily speculative. However, generally the
prototype model would predict different ERP components for
categorization than for recognition. For instance Early visual
potentials (N1, 156–200 msecs) [17] for categorization and latter
parietal potentials (400-msecs) for recognition [20]. Models such as
the exemplar or episodic accounts that claim that categorization
and categorization are predicated on the same underlying
processes are likely to predict similar components.
Methods
Ethics statement
This study was approved by the ethical review board at the
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, UK. Written
consent was obtained from all the participants who were free to
withdraw from the study at any time.
Participants
Sixty-three right-handed volunteers took part in the experiment.
Their mean age was 26 years (sd = 5.35); 40 were male and 23
were female. The participants were paid £20 (approx. J27,
US$40).
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of dot-patterns constructed using the
method described by Posner, Goldsmith and Welton [7]. Using
this method we first created a prototype pattern and then we
created three lists each with 40 items. Distorting the coordinates of
the prototype pattern created List 1 and List 3 items. List 2 items
were pseudo-random patterns (see Figure 1).
Design and Procedure
This was a 26262 mixed model design with Exposure (Pre-
exposed vs. Control) and Instructions (Recognition vs. Categori-
zation) as between-subjects factors and List (1 vs. 2) as a within-
subject factor. In each case these lists were composed of the same
items.
The experiment consisted of a study period and a test period.
During the study period the pre-exposed participants were
presented with either List 1 items in the Recognition Condition,
or List 3 items in the Categorization condition. The participants
were told that the study was an experiment on visual attention and
were asked to look for the dot closest to the centre of the screen but
were not given any instructions about the presence of a category or
how to encode the items. Study trials consisted of a 3000 msec
white fixation cross, followed by a study item that appeared for
5000 msecs with a white frame. The control participants were
informed that they were taking part in an experiment on
subliminal perception and visual attention. Control ‘study’ trials
consisted of a 3000 msec white fixation cross. After this a black
screen was displayed for 1000 msec, then the screen flashed white
for 50 msecs, followed by a black screen with an empty white box
visible for 50 msecs, followed by another white screen for 50 msecs
before an empty black screen returned for 4000 msecs. The
control participants were also asked to try and identify the central
dot in each pattern but that they would be presented very briefly
and be difficult to see. After the end of the study period there was a
short break during which the electrodes were checked. No EEG
was recorded during the study period.
Prior to the test the participants in the Categorization
conditions were told that all of the items that they had just seen
were instances of a category and that they would now see some
new items, some of which belonged to the category and some did
not. Each test trial consisted of a 3000 msec fixation cross. Each
test item appeared for 5000 msecs followed by a prompt to
indicate whether the item was category member or not. The
participants in the recognition conditions were told that they
would be given a recognition test for the items that they had just
studied.
We presented the same 40 category members and 40 category
non-members to the four groups during the test phase. The two
Pre-exposed groups had already been presented with category
members during the study phase. For the Pre-exposed Recognition
group these were the same 40 category members as were
subsequently used in the testing phase (i.e. List 1). For the Pre-
exposed Categorization group the study items were different
category members to those we subsequently used for the test phase
(i.e. List 3). By changing the study items in each condition, List 1
items were ‘old’ for the recognition group because they had also
appeared as study item. For the Categorization group the List 1
items were new in the sense that they had not appeared in the
study period but belonged to the same category as the study items.
ERP recording and ERP formation
EEG was recorded throughout each block in the test-phase
using a 128-channel electrical geodesic net (Electrical Geodesics,
Inc.: EGI) [23], digitised at 250 Hz. The recording was performed
with a hardware bandpass filter of 0.01 Hz to 100 Hz. Before
recording, impedance on each of the 128 electrodes was reduced
to ,50 kV. Due to amplification techniques, the EGI system
provides an excellent signal-to-noise ratio, despite these relatively
high electrode impedances [24]. The vertex was used as an
acquisition reference.
Stimulus-locked epochs were created, time-locked to each test
item, with each epoch starting 100 ms before stimulus onset and
ending 1000 ms afterwards. Segments were rejected if contami-
nated by eye-blinks/movements (indicated by EOG activity
greater that 70 mV). This process was also checked manually.
Trials containing voltage amplitudes greater than 200 mv or a
change greater than 100 mv were also removed. We did not reject
‘error’ trials, as control participants who have never seen the items
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before cannot correctly ‘recognize’ them. Instead we objectively
classified stimuli as to whether they were List 1 or List 2 items.
ERPs elicited by these two types of stimuli were compared across
the four groups of subjects. The average waveform for each
stimulus type, for each subject, comprised at least 25 individual
trials.
Waveform comparisons
Segments were average-referenced to a standard adult 128-
electrode montage. Epochs were baseline-corrected for the first
100 ms before the onset of the stimulus. We formed clusters of
electrodes, as means of data reduction. By using clusters rather
than individual electrodes we were able to cover a large portion of
the scalp and still include ‘electrode position’ in our ANOVAs,
alongside the other within- and between-subjects factors, without
the ANOVAs become uninterpretable. Our clusters covered 71
electrode sites, and were organised into 12 clusters, one around
each of the following electrodes: F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz,
P4, PO3, Oz and PO4. The specific clusters that we used can be
seen in Figure 2.
We created four time-bins, based upon the preceding literature,
and compared the mean amplitude values across each bin. These
are labelled as the early bin (160–200 ms, post item onset), the
mid-latency bin (320–480 ms) and the late-latency bin (480–
800 ms). In each bin we used a mixed-design ANOVA. This
always comprised the between-subjects factors of Exposure (two
levels, Pre-exposed versus un-exposed Control groups), and
Instructions (two levels, Recognition versus Categorisation groups).
The ANOVA also always included the within-subjects factor of
List (two levels, List 1 vs. List 2). This enabled us to test whether
List 1 and List 2 items elicited different ERPs, and whether the
evoked response to the items was influenced by the participants’
prior experience and judgement type. It also enabled us to test
whether or not these factors interacted with one another.
In addition to these three experimental factors we included
electrode cluster location in our ANOVAs, to test whether the
distribution of any of the above effects differed across the
conditions. Electrode cluster location was entered as two factors:
cluster position along the left-to-right lateral axis (three levels,
subsequently labelled electrode [L-R]) and cluster position along
the anteroposterior axis (four levels, subsequently labelled
electrode [A-P]).
All of our analyses were initially conducted on unscaled data.
However, where this revealed an interaction between any of the
experimental factors and any of the electrode factors we
recalculated the ANOVA using data scaled according to
McCarthy and Wood’s [25] rescaling technique. The logic behind
this was as follows: with un-scaled data the interaction between the
experimental and electrode factors is necessarily ambiguous; an
interaction could arise from a genuine difference in the
distribution of the effects across the two conditions, or simply
from the main effect having a multiplicative effect across the
electrodes. Scaling results in data normalisation; with the main
effect removed, one can then test for a genuine interaction
between that experimental factor and electrode position. It is,
however, worth noting that this technique is not perfect: Urbach
Figure 2. Electrode Montage.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010116.g002
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and Kutas [26] demonstrated that this approach can fail to
properly take account of the main effect, resulting in incorrectly
reporting a significant interaction with electrode location; in some
cases this normalisation may produce the opposite effect, masking
genuine topographical differences. However, this is the most
recognised means of disambiguating interactions involving elec-
trode location, and as such we applied it to our data where
necessary. That said, any topographical differences between
experimental factors established using an ANOVA, either
reported here or elsewhere, should be interpreted with caution
[27]. All of the results that we report are corrected using the
Greenhouse-Geisser correction, to account for the potential non-
sphericity of EEG data [28]. (Figures show data prior to rescaling.)
Results
Behavioural results
Responses to items that were identified as category members
were treated as endorsements in the categorization condition, and
responses to items that were identified as ‘old’ were treated as
endorsements in the recognition condition. The mean proportions
of endorsements for each List and Condition are shown for each
condition in Figure 3. These data were entered into a 26262
mixed model ANOVA with Exposure (Pre-exposed vs. Control)
and Instructions (Recognition vs. Categorization) as between-
subjects factors and List (1 vs. 2) as a within-subject factor. This
revealed a main effect of List (F1, 59 = 109.08, MSE = .02, p,.01,
g2p,.65) indicating reliable discrimination between items. A
marginal effect of Exposure (F1, 59 = 2.87, MSE = .02, p,.09,
g2p,.05) and a reliable interaction between Exposure and List
indicated that discrimination was higher in the Pre-exposed
conditions than in the Control conditions (F1, 59 =26.41,MSE = .02,
p,.01, g2p,.31). These results clearly show that discrimination
between category members and non-members, and between old and
new items is greater following pre-exposure than in control
participants.
However, there was no effect of Instructions (F1, 59= 0.18,MSE =
.02, p= .67, g2p,.01), and no interaction between either Instructions
and List (F1, 59 =1.82, MSE = .02, p= .18, g
2
p = .03), or between
Instructions and Exposure (F1, 59= 0.26, MSE = .02, p= .61,
g2p,.01). There was no 3-way interaction (F1, 59 =0.08, MSE =
.02, p= .78, g2p,.01). This aspect of the results is consistent with the
view that when items to be recognized are the same as items to be
categorized similar patterns of discrimination performance result.
This is indicative of the same or similar processes being utilized to
make different decisions. That is, categorization is a form of
recognition.
To more closely examine discrimination in the four conditions,
and to permit a power analysis, we next computed the sensitivity
index d’ by treating endorsements to List 1 items as hits, and
endorsements to List 2 items as False Alarms. A comparison of the
two pre-exposed groups showed that instructions to recognize or
categorize items did not result in a reliable difference in
discrimination (d’ = 1.30, vs. 1.20 respectively, t31= 0.39, p= .70).
So that we may be confident that our experiment was sufficiently
powerful to detect a possible difference between recognition and
categorization we estimated the effect sizes of data from two
previous reported comparisons. Both of these made within subject
comparisons of these decisions but used different items in each test.
The first reported d9 values of 7.23 and 0.72 for recognition and
categorization respectively, from a sample of 4 participants who
were acting as controls against an amnesic patient [10]. From the
figures that they report we first estimated the pooled standard
deviation (s2p =0.80) and used this to estimate the effect size (Cohen’s
d=7.27). We then calculated the sample size that we would need to
find an effect of this magnitude in a between subjects design. The
result was 2 participants in each group. Our sample size of 31 easily
exceeds this. The second study reported a mean percentage of
correct recognition decisions to be 86.0% versus, 64.2% correct
categorization decisions, with a sample of 10 and 9 respectively (due
to a recording error) [22]. As before we estimated the pooled
standard deviation from their reported figures (s2p =11.81). The
resulting effect size smaller than the other study but is nonetheless
large (Cohen’s d=1.85). The sample size needed to find an effect of
this magnitude in a between subjects design is 8 participants in each
group. Our sample size also easily exceeds this. The average
weighted effect size of both of these studies is Cohen’s d=3.45, and
requires a total sample size of just 6 participants. We are therefore
confident that had there been a difference in categorization and
recognition judgements it would have been detected in our sample
of 31 participants. We conclude from this that previous dissociations
between categorization and recognition might reflect differences in
the test items rather than differences in process.
We also examined whether the control participants were able to
discriminate between items by comparing their performance against
a chance value of d’=0. There was some indication of above chance
performance following recognition instructions (d’=0.47, t14 =3.09,
sd= .59, p,.01), but not following categorization instructions
(d’ =0.32, t14 =1.76, sd= .71, p= .10). This suggests that some
abstraction of the category structure can occur during the testing
period, in the sense that untrained controls were able to make
accurate decisions without any exposure to the study items [29], but
this is insufficient to account for the substantially greater number of
correct decisions made by the pre-exposed participants.
ERP Results
Although the behavioural performance was equivalent across
the Recognition and Categorisation groups we were keen to
Figure 3. Behavioural Results. Showing the proportions of
endorsements for each list for recognition and categorization
conditions by exposure. Error bars are +/2 SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010116.g003
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establish whether the ERP data shown in Figures 4 and 5 could
distinguish between categorisation and recognition judgements,
with and without prior exposure.
Early effects (160–200 ms). Our first comparison was
centred on the window most reliably associated with the N1
potential. This had previously distinguished between category
members and non-members [17]. In our data, the effect elicited by
the items appeared to be more negative in the Categorisation
groups than in either of the Recognition groups; more negative in
the un-exposed Control groups than in the Pre-exposed groups
and more negative for List 1 items than for List 2 items.
Furthermore, it appeared that these factors interacted: whilst both
the Pre-exposed Categorisation and Recognition groups showed a
more negative N1 component for List 1 relative to List 2, of the
un-exposed Control groups, only the Categorisation group showed
a greater negativity for List 1 relative to List 2.
Our ANOVA revealed main effects of Instruction with the
amplitudes in the Categorisation groups being more negative than
in the Recognition groups (F1, 56 = 7.40, p,.01), Exposure with the
Exposed groups being more negative than the Control groups
(F1, 56 = 4.03, p,.05), and List with List 1 eliciting a greater
negativity than List 2 (F1, 56 = 5.93, p,.02). There was also a
marginally significant interaction between these three factors
(F1, 56 = 3.98, p,.06). This resulted from an interaction between
List and Instructions in the un-exposed Control groups only
(F1, 28 = 5.04, p= .03): there was a relative negativity for List 1
relative to List 2 in the Control Categorisation group (F1, 14 = 4.84,
p..05), but not in the Control Recognition group. By contrast, in
Figure 4. ERPs potentials in the Recognition conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010116.g004
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the Pre-exposed groups there was no interaction between List and
Instructions, there was just a simple main effect of List
(F1, 28 = 4.65, p= .04), with List 1 items eliciting a greater
negativity relative to List 2 items.
We also observed various interactions between these experi-
mental factors and one or both of the electrode factors. Given the
main effects of the experimental factors, we scaled the data and
recalculated the ANOVA. An interaction between List and
electrode[A-P] survived the normalisation (F2.53, 141.85 = 3.02,
p= .04). This resulted from List 1 items being significantly more
negative than List 2 items over the parietal (F1, 59 = 5.47, p= .02)
and occipital electrode clusters (F1, 59 = 4.35, p= .04), though not
over the other electrode clusters. An interaction between List,
instruction and electrode[L-R] also survived the normalisation
(F1.95, 109.54 = 3.73, p,.03. This resulted from an interaction
between List and instruction over the midline electrodes
(F1, 58 = 4.83, p= .03), though not over the left or right-hemisphere
electrodes. This in turn resulted from a significant negativity for
List 1 items relative to List 2 items in the Categorisation groups
(F1, 29 = 7.34, p= .01), though not for the Recognition groups.
Mid-latency effects (320–480 ms). There were no main
effects of any of the experimental factors within this time window.
However, there were two interactions between the experimental
and electrode factors: prior exposure interacted significantly with
electrode[L-R] (F1.72, 96.50 = 3.87, p= .03). This was not driven by
any one cluster significantly, though List 1 items elicited a
Figure 5. ERPs potentials in the Categorization conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010116.g005
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marginally more negative amplitude over the midline electrodes in
the Exposed groups relative to the Control groups (F1, 56 = 3.43,
p= .06). We also observed a marginally significant interaction
between List, electrode[L-R] and electrode[A-P] (F3.53, 197.72 =
2.45, p= .05). This was because List 1 items elicited a
greater positivity than List 2 items over the right-hemisphere
central cluster (F1, 56 = 12.73, p,.01), but not over any other
clusters.
Late-latency effects (480–800 ms). There were no main
effects or interactions between any of the experimental factors.
There were two significant interactions between experimental and
electrode factors: Instruction, Exposure and electrode[L-R]
interacted significantly (F1.55, 86.83 = 3.67, p= .04). There was no
clear effect driving this interaction, though the closest to reaching
significance was an interaction between Exposure and electrode[L-
R] in the Categorisation groups (F1.37, 38.33 = 3.44, p= .06), which
had not been present in the Recognition groups. This marginal
effect was, in turn, driven by relatively more negative amplitudes
for the Exposed, relative to the un-exposed Control group, over
the left-hemisphere clusters (F1, 28 = 3.96, p= .05). We also noted a
significant interaction between List, electrode[L-R] and
electrode[A-P] (F3.94, 220.87 = 5.62, p,.01). This was the result of
a significant negativity over the left frontal cluster (F1, 58 = 5.45,
p= .02), and a significant positivity over the right frontal
(F1, 58 = 7.24, p,.01) and central (F1, 58 = 7.31, p,.01) clusters,
for List 1 items relative to List 2 items.
Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to examine the ERPs of
categorization and recognition in the well-known prototype-
distortion task [7]. Previous studies have used either amnesic
patients [5] or fMRI [6] to dissociate categorization from
recognition. To our knowledge this is the first to use ERP to do
so, although one previous study has used a less well known
paradigm to examine the same processes [17]. These previous
studies have compared recognition judgements made to one set of
items to categorization judgements made to a different set of items.
The resulting differences are frequently cited as evidence that
prototype knowledge is used to make categorization decisions
using a separate process than episodic memory of the study items
that is used to make recognition judgements. This particular
experimental preparation makes the interpretation of dissociations
involving amnesic patients or fMRI difficult because they may be
due, as is claimed, to the processes involved, or to differences in
the stimuli themselves. In this experiment we sought to resolve this
problem by asking participants to make recognition and
categorization judgements to the same set of stimuli. The
participants were allocated to four groups were presented with
the same category members and non-members (termed ‘List 1’
and ‘List 2’ items, respectively). A key finding was that participants
were equally able to distinguish List 1 from List 2 items, regardless
of whether they had been asked to attempt to categorise or
recognise them. This is in contrast to previous studies that have
compared these decisions to different items [10,22]. We did not
replicate these effects despite sufficient experimental power to do
and so conclude that the dissociations reported previously could be
due to differences in the stimuli rather than difference in the
processes used to judge them. Nonetheless, previous studies have
reported activity in different brain regions dependent on the
decision that participants are asked to make, and although we
observed no differences in the decisions that the participants made
this does not preclude differences in the neural processes used to
make those decisions. Indeed the ERP data from our experiment
demonstrated that the early visual evoked response that distin-
guished category members and non-members was modulated by
whether participants had been asked to categorise or recognise
them, and, although not to the same extent, by whether
participants had previously been exposed to those items.
Influence of instruction and prior exposure on early
visual processing of items. In the window usually associated
with the N1 potential, List 1 elicited a significantly more negative
potential than did List 2 items. This was most prominent over the
parietal and occipital electrodes. However, unlike previous research
[17], we found that the N1 amplitude was modulated by more than
just category membership. Whilst the early effect of List was not
affected by judgement for both the Pre-exposed Recognition and
Categorisation groups, the effect was only present for the Control
Categorisation group. The Control Recognition group showed no
such early differentiation between List 1 and List 2 items. This result
overlapped with another result: taken together the Categorisation
groups showed an increased negativity for List 1 relative to List 2
items over the midline electrodes, whereas the Recognition groups
did not, presumably because whilst both Categorisation groups
showed the effect, only the Pre-exposed Recognition group did.
Effects driven primarily by changes to the N1 amplitude are typically
ascribed to early visual processing in the extrastriate cortex [18].
Indeed, recent fMRI studies have linked early visual processing with
prototype abstraction/application [6,12]. Interestingly, we observed
these effects for both Categorisation groups, regardless of whether or
not they had previously been exposed to the category members.
Possibly, when the participants’ task is to categorise items, prototype
abstraction/application can occur within the test phase. This would
explain why even the un-exposed Control Categorisation group
showed the N1 amplitude differentiation for List 1 and List 2 items.
By contrast, this might not be the case when the participants’ task is
to attempt to recognise the items. In this case, participants only
engage in prototype abstraction/application when they have already
had some experience of category members. This account makes
intuitive sense: when the task is to categorise abstract items based
upon arbitrary but consistent perceptual characteristics, the
participant will pay close attention to those consistent
characteristics that distinguish category members from non-
members – this is the case even these have not been encountered
previously. By contrast, when the task is to ‘recognise’ abstract items,
the participant might only proceed with prototype abstraction/
application when it becomes apparent that those membership-
defining characteristics discriminate between the items that were
studied earlier form those that were not. That is, when attempting to
recognise the items, participants will only engage in this process
when they have already been exposed to the category members. The
Control group might simply not realise the prototype abstraction/
application is beneficial for their ‘recognition’ task.
When one observes an effect that can occur in both Pre-exposed
Categorisation and Recognition groups, it might be tempting to
take this as evidence that both tasks tap some common
recognition-like mechanism. However, in the case of this early
N1 effect, this would not explain why the Control Categorisation
group also show the effect: they cannot be recognising items that
they have not seen before. By contrast, both the Pre-exposed
Categorisation and Recognition groups could be employing a
categorisation-like strategy. With our stimuli and procedure such a
strategy would be successful for both of the Pre-exposed groups,
but only for the Control Categorisation group. The Control
Recognition group, in contrast to the Pre-exposed Recognition
group, would have no category for ‘‘old’’ items and therefore
would not be able to use this strategy. Interestingly, this is precisely
the pattern of N1-like effects that we observed.
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Influence of instruction and prior exposure on later
potentials. The effects elicited by List 1 and List 2 items also
differed later in the epoch: there was a greater positivity for List 1
relative to List 2 items over the right-hemisphere central electrode
cluster, between 320 and 480 ms. Again, later in the epoch,
between 480 and 800 ms, List 1 items elicited a negativity over the
left-hemisphere and positivity over the right-hemisphere, relative
to List 2 items. Whilst the time window corresponds to the
differences reported in previous papers [17], the effects themselves
are quite different in terms of distribution and amplitude in our
data. Unlike the early N1-like effects, the later effects were
primarily driven by differences between List 1 and List 2 items,
regardless of which judgement participants performed and their
prior exposure to category members. At least with regard to these
later effects, they appear to reflect some process common to
categorisation and recognition, a conclusion perhaps supported by
the similarity in behavioural performance between the two
judgement types.
Conclusions
Participants were equally good at distinguishing category
members from non-members, regardless of whether they were
performing a categorisation or recognition judgement. This result
contrasts shapely with previous studies that have reported
differences between categorization and recognition judgements.
However, the ERPs suggested that participants’ early visual
potentials (160–200 ms), often associated with prototype abstrac-
tion/application, distinguished category members from non-
members in both the Pre-exposed Recognition and Categorisation
groups. By contrast, in the un-exposed Control groups, only the
participants explicitly asked to categorise the items showed this
early visual differentiation of members and non-members – the
un-exposed Control Recognition group did not. One possible
interpretation of these data is that prototype abstraction/
application occurs on both categorisation and recognition tasks,
but only when participants have actually been pre-exposed to
category members. If they have not been pre-exposed then
prototype abstraction/application will only occur in a categorisa-
tion task. The data suggest that both categorization and
recognition in prototype distortion tasks appear to rely on the
same underlying process.
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